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INTRODUCTION

2
The failure of over five hundred1 savings and loan institutions
during the 1980s prompted Congress to pass the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)3 in 1989. 4 FIRREA is a comprehensive piece of legislation which revised and
amended a substantial portion of the laws governing financial institutions. 5 Through FIRREA, Congress sought to restructure the savings
and loan industry to prevent another crisis.6 Additionally, Congress
sought to provide a mechanism to effectively manage and resolve
distressed savings institutions. 7 To achieve these goals, Congress es-

1. Vicki 0. Tucker et al., The RTC: A PracticalGuide to the Receivership/Conservatorship
Process and the Resolution of Failed Trusts, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1990).
2. The term "savings industry" will be used throughout this note to refer to the industry
comprised of those state and federally chartered savings banks and savings and loan institutions
whose deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
The term "savings institution" will be used throughout this note to refer to state and federally
chartered savings banks and savings and loan institutions.
3. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered provisions of 12 U.S.C.
and 15 U.S.C. (Supp. 11 1990 & Supp. III 1991)).
4. See S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989). The number of savings institutions
which failed from 1980 to 1988 totals more than three and one-half times the bank failures in
the previous 45 years combined. Id. Since September 30, 1989, the RTC has held more than
283 savings institutions in conservatorship. Status and Activities of the RTC and the Oversight
Board: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision Regulation and
Insurance and the Resolution Trust Corparation Task Force of the Committee on Banking,

Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1989) (statement of David Cooke, CEO,
RTC). These institutions have total assets of over $112 billion and liabilities of over $124 billion.
Id.

5. See Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A Decade's Journey from "Deregulation" to
"Supervisory Regulation": The FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103, 1107 (1990). FIRREA amended various provisions of Titles 12 and
15 U.S.C. Id. FIRREA makes additions, modifications, and amendments to many acts including:
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1811-1834 (1988) (amended 1989)); the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, Pub.
L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1988) (amended
1989)); the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. 88 1421-1447 (1988) (amended 1989)); the Holding Company Act of 1956,
Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988)
(amended 1989)); and the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. 88 1701-1735 (1988) (amended 1989)).
6. See Tucker et al., supra note 1, at 3.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 103 [hereinafter H.R. REP.1.
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tablished the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), an organization
given special powers to efficiently resolve and assist distressed savings
institutions." These powers include the ability to repudiate contracts
and leases into which the failed institution entered prior to conservatorship or receivership. 9 Congress' broad legislative reforms in FIRREA and its resolution mechanisms affect many of America's financial
institutions and have serious implications for professionals and organizations serving the financial institutions industry. 10
Section II of this note examines the events leading to the enactment
of FIRREA, the broad purposes of FIRREA, and the specific statutory authority of the RTC to repudiate contracts. Section III of this
note examines the scope of the RTC's authority to repudiate contracts
by addressing two issues raised by FIRREA: (1) whether the RTC
can repudiate non-executory contracts and (2) what contracts the RTC
may deem burdensome for the purpose of repudiation. Section IV of
this note examines the RTC's exercise of repudiation powers, focuses
on what factors the RTC evaluates in repudiating specific types of
contracts and what mechanisms the RTC uses to express these decisions. This discussion also addresses statutory provisions governing
the RTC's exercise of repudiation powers, policy statements in which
the RTC asserts its repudiation powers, and regulations controlling
the RTC's exercise of repudiation. Section IV concludes by discussing
the timing of repudiation. Finally, Section V of this note discusses
the damages a party may recover from the RTC for repudiation.
This note relies on several sources in interpreting the scope of the
RTC's power under FIRREA. First, recent decisions interpreting the
RTC's repudiation powers under FIRREA provide insight into the
scope of these powers. Second, common law of receivership prior to
FIRREA serves an important interpretive role in assessing the RTC's
powers as receiver." Third, cases decided under the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) regulations preceding FIRREA are helpful because the regulations resemble FIRREA's provisions. Finally, an interpretation of the scope of the RTC's receivership

8. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. II 1990).
9. See id. § 1821(e).
10. See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 308-12.
11. See T. Ray Guy, Unsecured Creditors, in LITIGATING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC:
ASSET-BASED CLAIMS 103, 139 (PLI Com. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
559, 1990) (commenting that FIRREA essentially codifies a common-law receiver's power to
repudiate contracts, with some modifications).
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powers takes into account FIRREA's mandates and objectives and
the specific goals FIRREA establishes for the RTC.

II.

THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS AND THE
ENACTMENT OF FIRREA

The events preceeding the failure of the saving and loan industry
underlie the legislative goals of FIRREA and the objectives of the
RTC.' 2 Originally, Congress established the savings and loan industry
to provide a funding mechanism for purchasing residential housing. 13
Accordingly, savings institutions initially served the residential housing market' 4 and were limited to a narrower scope of financial activities
than commercial banks.15 Congress enacted separate regulatory
schemes to govern the commercial banking and the savings industries,1 6 established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to
regulate savings institutions,' 7 and established the FSLIC to insure
the savings institutions' deposits.' 8
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the savings and loan industry
suffered enormous losses due to an industry-wide liquidity crisis.19 In
response, Congress, the FHLBB, and state regulatory authorities
expanded the power of savings institutions beyond their traditional
home financing activities.20 These governmental actions gave savings
institutions greater investment abilities and allowed these institutions
to compete with commercial banks for funds. Using their new powers,

12. See Gail & Norton, supra note 5, at 1104-05.
13. See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 292. Following the Great Depression, Congress passed
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, and the National
Housing Act of 1934 to provide mechanisms for obtaining residential housing. Id. at 292-93.
14. Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1016 (1990).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1988) (repealed by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103
Stat. 183, 282 (1989)).
18. Id. § 1725 (repealed by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 407, 103 Stat. 183, 363 (1989)).
19. Northeast Sav., F.A. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 770 F. Supp. 19, 20
(D.D.C. 1991) (liquidity crises due to high interest rates and inflation).
20. Id.
21. Id. In order to enhance the profitability of savings institutions, Congress in the late
1970s and early 1980s enacted legislation which broadened the authority of federal- and state-chartered savings institutions to lend and invest. Clark et al., supra note 14, at 1019-20. For example,
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 permitted federal savings institutions
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savings institutions aggressively entered the commercial real estate
market and other speculative markets.2 During this period of significant restructuring, the federal government exercised little supervision
over the burgeoning savings and loan industry. 2 Without supervision,
savings institutions grew rapidly by acquiring poorly collateralized
loan portfolios.2 Shortly thereafter, many savings institutions engaging in speculative ventures failed due to poor economic conditions and
portfolio mismanagement.2 These failed savings institutions looked to
the FSLIC to pay insured depositors8 and quickly depleted the
FSLIC's insurance fund.2 7
Congress examined these historical events in attempting to devise
a remedy for the past and present weakness in the savings and loan
industry.28 Because Congress determined that the industry's failure
stemmed in part from inadequate supervision, Congress restructured
the regulatory system governing savings institutions.29 in doing so
Congress abolished the savings and loan industry's primary regulator,
the FHLBB,30 and created the Office of Thrift Supervision to regulate
both federal and state savings institutions.3 1 Congress remedied the
FSLIC's insurance fund depletion by abolishing the FSLIC3 and shift-

to invest up to 10% of their assets in commercial and agricultural loans and increased the limits
on loans secured by nonresidential real estate from 20% to 40% of the institution's assets. Id.
at 1020-21.
22. Clark et al., supra note 14, at 1021.
23. See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 301.
24. See id.; Northeast Savings, 770 F. Supp. at 20-21.
25. See Gall & Norton, supra note 5, at 1104-05. In enacting FIRREA, Congress assumed
that the savings and loan industry and its insurance fund failed due to the ineptitude and fraud
of savings institution management in dealing with new investment powers. Id. In reality, failure
was due in part to adverse economic conditions and the legislature's increasingly restrictive
approach to bank and savings institution regulation. Id.
26. See Northeast Savings, 770 F. Supp. at 20-21.
27. Id. During the first six months of 1988, the savings industry suffered losses greater
than $7.5 billion. 134 CONG. REC. S15,226-01 (1988) (statement of Frederick D. Wolf, Director,
Accounting and Financial Management Division, the U.S. General Accounting Office).
28. See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 291-302.
29. See Tucker et al., supra note 1, at 2-3.
30. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401(a)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 354 (1989). The FHLBB
was the governmental body responsible for chartering, examining, and supervising federally-chartered savings institutions which were insured by the FSLIC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988).
It also was responsible for administering the FSLIC. Id. § 1725(a).
31. See FIRREA, § 301, 103 Stat. 277, 278, 280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462a(a), 1463(a)
(Supp. II 1990)).
32. Id. § 401(a)(1), 103 Stat. 354 (1989).
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ing responsibility for insuring savings institutions to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Finally, Congress created the
RTC to act as conservator or receiver of the failed savings institutions.3
Although Congress abolished the federal insurer and the primary
regulator of the savings and loan industry, Congress specifically intended to maintain the savings and loan industry as a separate and
viable industry.3 Congress intended6 that the savings and loan industry
continue providing home financing and through FIRREA, Congress
also sought to restore public confidence in the savings and loan indus37
try.
In addition to FIRREA's broad goals, Congress set forth specific
goals to guide the RTC in resolving failed institutions and distributing
the institutions' property. Congress requires that the RTC maximize
returns from the sale and disposition of a failed institution or its
assets,38 minimize the impact of transactions on local real estate and
40
'
financial markets, 39 minimize losses realized in the resolution of cases,
make efficient use of funds obtained from either the Resolution Funding Corporation or the Treasury,4 1 and maximize the preservation of
available and affordable residential real property for low - and moderate-income individuals. 42 Additionally, Congress requires the RTC to
preserve and conserve the assets and property of the failed institutions 43 and to resolve claims in an effective and efficient manner."

33. See id. § 402(a), 103 Stat 357-58.
34. Id. § 501, 103 Stat. 363, 369 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b) (Supp. I 1990)). The
RTC assumed the FSLIC's role as receiver of failed savings associations which were insured
by the FSLIC and placed into receivership or conservatorship after January 1, 1989, but before
August 9, 1989. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I). The RTC also acts as receiver for savings associations
insured by the FDIC and placed into receivership or conservatorship from August 9, 1989 to
August 9, 1992. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)(ii)(II). The RTC has no staff and all of its responsibilities
are performed by the FDIC. Id. § 1441a(b)(9)(A). Additionally, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) gives
the RTC the same powers and rights to carry out its duties as the FDIC has under §§ 11, 12,
and 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
35. See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 309.
36. Id.
37.

Id. at 307.

38. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i) (Supp. 1 1990).
39. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(ii).
40. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(iv).
41. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(iii).
42. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(v).
43. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv).
44. H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 419.
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To achieve the specific goals of resolution, Congress gave the RTC
special power as a receiver or conservator for savings institutions to
repudiate contracts and leases the failed institution entered into prior
to conservatorship or receivership5 The RTC's power of repudiation
is not unprecedented. At common law, a receiver had the right to
elect whether or not it would adopt and perform executory contracts
made by the entity in receivership prior to the appointment of the
receiver.4 6 Thus, the receiver had the right to repudiate any executory
47
contract it found burdensome to the entity.
Initially, receivers for failed banks exercised this common law
power of repudiation only occasionally in connection with their general
receivership responsibilities. 4 s Receivers for FDIC-insured institutions
exercised this common law repudiation power until FIRREA was
enacted.49 Additionally, conservators and receivers for FSLIC-insured
savings institutions had express regulatory power to repudiate any
contract or lease they considered burdensome.Although savings institution receivers have authority to repudiate
contracts under both common law and federal regulations, FIRREA
provides these receivers with specific statutory authority to repudiate
contracts and leases. 51 Section 1821e(1) of Title 12, as amended by
FIRREA, gives the RTC the general authority to repudiate contracts
and leases made before its appointment as conservator or receiver,
subject to three conditions:52 (1) the failed institution in receivership
or conservatorship must be a party to the contract;-s (2) the conservator

45. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (Supp. II 1990).
46. 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 169 (1952).
47. Id.
48. See People ex rel. Nelson v. West Town State Bank, 25 N.E.2d 509 (Ill.
1940) (allowing
receiver for banking corporation to disaffirm lease for bank premises).
49. Rex R. Veal, ContractRepudiation Under the FinancialInstitutionsReform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989, in LITIGATING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC, supra note 11, at
231, 233.
50. 12 C.F.R. § 549.3() (1968) (allowing the FSLIC as receiver for federally-chartered
savings association to repudiate any lease or contract which it considers burdensome).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990). FIRREA permits the RTC to "disaffirm or
repudiate" a contract. Id. The terms disaffirm and repudiate have essentially the same meaning.
The term "disaffirm" means "to repudiate; to revoke a consent once given. . . ." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 462 (6th ed. 1990). The term "repudiate" means 'to put away, reject, disclaim,
or renounce a right, duty, obligation, or privilege." Id. at 1303.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
53. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(A).
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or receiver must determine that the contract or lease must be burdensome;M and (3) the repudiation must promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs. 55 Part two of the section 11(e) discusses
timing of the repudiation.56 Part three sets forth damages recoverable
for repudiation in general. 57 The next five sections expand on the
general provisions above and relate to specific types of contracts.
These sections four through eight specifically discuss leases in which
the institution is lessee, leases in which the institution is lessor,59
60
and qualified financial contracts.

III.

THE SCOPE OF THE RTC's REPUDIATION POWERS

Section 1821e(1) of Title 12, entitled "Authority to repudiate contracts,"' 6' defines the general scope of the RTC's repudiation powers.
This section indicates that "[i]n addition to any other rights a conservator or receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for any insured
depository institution may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or
lease. 162 The provision establishes three requirements which the RTC
must prove to repudiate a contract or lease: (1) the institution must
be a party to the contract or lease;- (2) the contract or lease must
be burdensome;6 and (3) the repudiation must be beneficial to the
orderly administration of the institutions' affairs.- This general repudiation provision raises important issues regarding the scope of the
RTC's repudiation powers.
A.

The RTC's Ability to Repudiate Non-Executory Contracts

FIRREA's statutory language confers broad repudiation powers
on the RTC by giving the RTC the ability to repudiate "any contract."6

54. Id: § 1821(e)(1)(B).
55. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(C).
56. Id. § 1821(e)(2).
57. Id. § 1821(e)(3).
58. Id. § 1821(e)(4).
59. Id. § 1821(e)(5).
60. Id. § 1821(e)(8); see also id. § 1821(e)(6) (contracts for the sale of real property); id. §
1821(e)(7) (provision applicable to service contracts).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
62.

Id.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. § 1821(e)(1)(A).
Id. § 1821(e)(1)(B).
Id. § 1821(e)(1)(C).
See id. § 1821(e)(1); Gibson v. RTC, 750 F. Supp. 1565, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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The plain language of section 1821(e)(1) suggests that the RTC can
repudiate any contract, regardless of its nature, thus implying that
67
the RTC can repudiate both executory and non-executory contracts.
Historically, common law and bankruptcy receivers had the ability to
repudiate only executory contracts.6 Therefore, the RTC's purported
ability to repudiate non-executory contracts is a controversial extension of traditional receivership powers.
Commentators are divided on the issue of whether Congress intended FIRREA to extend a receiver's repudiation powers to nonexecutory contracts. Several commentators argue Congress merely
intended to codify a receiver's common law repudiation right and,9

therefore, suggest limiting repudiation to executory contracts only.6

Other commentators argue FIRREA's statutory language shows Congress' intent to allow the RTC to repudiate both non-executory and
executory contracts. 70 Those who support extending the RTC's repudiation power to any contract cite the multiple and often unclear definitions of the term "executory. 71 They reason that Congress intended

67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code indicates that a receiver can
repudiate executory contracts. Id. However, bankruptcy law has limited application in the
banking context and in the context of RTC receiverships. Congress expressly excluded banks
from the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. Unisys Corp. v. FDIC, 724 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D.
Tex. 1988) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), which states that "[a] person may be a debtor under
Chapter 7 of this title only if such person is not ... (2) a ... bank, savings bank, cooperative
bank, savings and loan association,... or similar institution which is an insured bank as defined
in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act"). Because the powers and goals of a bank
receiver differ from those of a bankruptcy receiver, equitable principles developed in reorganization cannot always be applied to failed banks. Corbin v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
629 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, banking institutions and insurance companies are
excluded from the Bankruptcy Code's liquidation provisions because alternate provisions for
their liquidation are found under various regulatory laws. H.R. REP. No. 595 to accompany
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 318-20 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.
69. Tucker et al., supra note 1, at 32; see also H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 331 (noting
that FIRREA "confirms" the "historic right" of receivers to repudiate contracts); R. Neal
Batson et al., The Management and Liquidation of Failed Financial Institutions Under the
FinancialInstitutionsReform, Recovery and EnforcementAct of 1989, in RESOLUTION TRUST
CORPORATION: BANKRUPTCIES, LIQUIDATION, AND SALES OF ASSETS 11, 44 (PLI Com. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 553, 1990) (suggesting that Congress most likely did
not intend to give the RTC repudiation powers beyond what bankruptcy trustees have under
the Bankruptcy Code - namely, the power to repudiate only "executory" contracts).
70. See Guy, supra note 11, at 137; Robert D. Barcley, Repudiation of Contracts by the
RTC: Is Your Contract Safe?, FLA. B.J., May 1991, at 48.
71. Guy, supra note 11, at 137. Guy comments that "with the enactment of the FIRREA
there is a more plausible argument that the regulatory authorities are trying to get away from
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to avoid these definitional problems by allowing the RTC to make its
repudiation decisions on a case-by-case basis.72
As this disagreement illustrates, the RTC's power to repudiate
"any contract" under FIRREA is undefined. Thus, courts may look
to common law when interpreting the RTC's repudiation powers. Although common law specifies that receivers can repudiate only executory contracts, 73 common law provides no single definition of the term
"executory contract."' 4 Under common law, a contract is either executory or executed.7 5 Generally, an executory contract has performance
remaining by both parties.76 However, when performance remains only

the historically litigatory quagmire of 'executory contracts' by establishing a new broad standard
with greater flexibility, where semantics become less significant than effects and results." Id.
72. See Batson et al., supra note 69, at 43-44.
73. See 66 AM. JUR. 2D, Receivers § 222 (1973).
74. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D, Contracts § 6 (1991). In the bankruptcy context, the definition of
the term executory also may dictate whether or not a receiver can reject a contract. Bankruptcy
Code § 365(a) permits a trustee, subject to court approval, to assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988). However, the Bankruptcy
Code has no definition of the term "executory contract." See id. Professor Vern Countryman
set forth the most commonly accepted definition of the term "executory contract" in the bankruptcy context as follows: "A contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contractin Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973). Countryman
required an executory contract to have performance due on both sides, because he believed this
requirement would best benefit the estate. See id. at 461. However, not all courts have adopted
Countryman's definition or reasoning. For example, several courts have held that an executory
contract requires substantial performance, other than the payment of money, by only one party
to the agreement. See, e.g., In re Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod., Inc., 45 B.R. 792, 794 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1985) (reasoning that contract is executory where one party grants an easement for
construction of a pipeline and other party has agreed to supply the other party with water from
its property through the pipeline, but has not yet done so); In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 228-31
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (finding that partnership contract containing non-competition clause
is executory when the partnership performed by employing debtor, but debtor did not perform
his obligation because he opened competing business). The Norquist court reasoned that rigid
adherence to the Countryman definition in all cases fails to accommodate the purposes of the
reorganization because it would not allow the receiver to reject burdensome contracts. Norquist,
43 B.R. at 226-28.
75. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 683 (1878).
76. 14 TEX. JUR. 3D Contracts § 10 (1981.). "An executory contract is one where it is
stipulated by the agreement of minds, upon a sufficient consideration, that something is to be
(lone or not to be done by one or both the parties." Farrington,95 U.S. at 682. Courts generally
agree that if the object of the agreement has already been performed by both parties according
to the terms of the contract, the contract is fully executed. Id. at 683.
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on one side, some authority indicates that a contract can be executed
as to one party and not the other-'
The disparity between common law definitions of "executory contract" in the receivership context often arises where one of the parties
has fully performed under the terms of the contract and only payment
by the non-performing party remains. Some courts have held such a
contract was executed 7s while other courts have indicated the non-performing party must complete payment to make the contract fully executed.7 9 Thus, when one of the parties has done everything required
under the contract, and nothing remains for him to do except receive
the purchase price, the contract may be deemed executory 0
At common law, when both parties had fully performed their contractual obligation, a receiver had no option to reject that fully executed contract.' However, when only one party had fully performed
its obligations, a court had discretion to classify the contract as executory for repudiation purposes, based on the ambiguity surrounding
the term "executory contract."' In exercising this discretion, courts
often limited the receiver's powers, precluding repudiation of contracts
in which one party had fully performed.8
For example, in Geddes v. Reeves Coal & Dock Co., 84 the court
held a contract was fully executed where one party had fully performed.s In Geddes, a dock company contracted with an auditor and

77. See, e.g., Wener v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 938, 946 (1957) (holding that agreement
retiring certain partners from partnership is fully executed and absolute as to them, but partly
executory as to other partners). When performance remains on only one side, courts divide on
the contract's classification. Some courts have indicated that a contract is executed if wholly
performed on one side, whether or not the other party has performed. Gugenheim v. Hancock,
231 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (holding that contract for purchase of stock is
executed when one party has done everything required of him by terms of contract and nothing
remains but for him to receive the purchase price).
78. Gugenheim, 231 S.W.2d at 939; see also North Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Valley
Farmers Bean Ass'n, 365 N.W.2d 528, 543 (N.D. 1985) (reasoning the contract is non-executory
if all acts giving rise to obligation to pay are performed and only payment remains).
79. See Pratt Lab., Inc. v. Teague, 160 F. Supp. 176, 180-81 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
80. See id.; In re San Francisco Bay Exposition, 50 F. Supp. 344, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1943)
(holding that contract not subject to disaffirmance under California building and loan statutes
when contract is fully performed by one party and performance gives rise to payment on part
of other party).
81. 17 Am.JUR. 2D Receivers § 229 (1973).
82. See PrattLaboratories, 160 F. Supp. at 180-81.
83. See Geddes v. Reeves Coal & Dock Co., 20 F.2d 48, 50, 52-53 (8th Cir. 1927).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 50, 52-53.
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agreed to pay the auditor for all refunds the auditor could find on
freight bill overcharges. s 6 The refunds were paid directly to the dock
company. 87 The dock company was placed in receivership and the lower
court denied the receiver's petition to continue the auditor's employment.- On appeal, the court found that the auditor had fully performed
his obligations89 and therefore had an equitable lien on the estate for
the money due.- The appellate court held that the receiver took the
estate subject to the auditor's rights under the contract and that the
principles of equity forbade revocation of the contract and destruction
of the equitable lien. 9' Thus, the Geddes court required the estate to
92
perform the contract.
Although the Geddes court narrowly construed the receiver's repudiation power, courts occasionally have taken broader view of this
power. 93 For example, the decision in Central Trust Co. v. Marietta
& N.G. Railway9 implicitly classified a contract, fully performed on
one side, as executory. 95 In Central Trust, a railway contracted with
a marble company to transport the company's marble to an intermediate location for cutting, then to its final destination.96 The marble
company prepaid the freight for the entire excursion.9- Thereafter,
the railway company went into receivership and the receiver terminated the contract while the marble was at the intermediate location.9

86. Id. at 49.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 53.
92. Id.
93. See Ellsworth E. Clark et al., Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by
Receivers, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1111 n.5 (1933). "[C]ontracts and leases under which the
obligations of the solvent party have been fully performed, but those of the insolvent remain
executory, are liabilities and performance by the receiver would ordinarily be improper as a
preference." Id. at 1111; see also Whightsel v. Felton, 95 F. 923 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1899) (holding
that even after employee, tort claimant, entered into agreement with employer not to bring
suit in exchange for payment and continued employment, and employee completed his obligation
not to bring suit, receiver for employer corporation properly refused to adopt contract to preserve
property of the receivership estate).
94. 51 F. 15 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1892).
95. Id. at 15-17.
96. Id. at 15.
97. Id. at 15-16.
98. Id. at 16.
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The court found that the receiver had properly repudiated the contract,
thus relieving the railway from completing performance under the
contract."
In Central Trust, the marble company had completely performed
its obligations by paying the full hauling price before the railway had
completed its hauling obligations. 1"0 Thus, at the time of the receiver's
appointment, one party to the contract had fully performed its obligations and one party had not. By permitting the receiver to repudiate
the contract, the court implicitly found the contract executory for the
purpose of repudiation.11 Relying on Central Trust, the RTC may
conclude that it has authority to repudiate a contract fully performed
on one side. 1' 2 If the RTC follows Central Trust, it can repudiate
contracts fully performed by one party, regardless of the contract's
semantic classification as executory or non-executory.'°3 Thus, the RTC
may claim broad repudiation powers that are arguably consistent with
powers of a common law receiver.
Additionally, the RTC can further support a claim of broad repudiation powers by relying on federal banking regulations preceding FIRREA. 1°4 Prior to FIRREA, federal banking regulations entitled the
FSLIC to repudiate "any . . . contract which it considers burdensome."10 5 The FSLIC exercised this regulatory power to repudiate a
contract in Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Angell,
Holmes & Lea. 1°6 In Angell, Federal Savings and Loan Association
(Federal) was in financial trouble and entered an agreement with
Angell, Holmes & Lea for legal representation. 10 7 Under the agreement, the entire retainer fee paid to Angell, Holmes & Lea would be
"deemed to have been earned upon payment," and the firm would
return none of the fee to Federal "regardless of whether attorneys
[were] for any reason prevented from performing any or all of the
services to be performed by attorney under [the] agreement."' 08

99. Id. at 16-17.
100. Id. at 15-16.
101. Id. at 15-17. The Central Trust court's decision implies the contract is executory
because common law receivers can repudiate only executory contracts. See Clark et al., supra
note 93, at 1111.
102. See Central Trust, 51 F. at 16.
103. See id.
104. See 12 .F.R. § 569(a)(6)(c)(3) (1989).
105. Id.
106. 838 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988).
107. Id. at 396.
108. Id.
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Shortly after the agreement was made, the FSLIC placed Federal in
receivership. 109 The FSLIC fired Angell, Holmes & Lea, but the firm
continued to provide legal services and attempted to keep the retainer
fee.11° The Angell court held that as receiver the FSLIC had the right
to dismiss counsel and repudiate any burdensome contract.' Therefore, the court ordered the firm to return the retainer, less payment
for services provided before repudiation.112
The Angell court did not classify the contract at issue as executory
or non-executory. 1 3 By paying the retainer fee, Federal had fully
performed its contractual obligations by the time of repudiation."4 The
law firm's assertion that Federal had made final and completed performance was further supported by the contract's term making Angell,
Holmes & Lea's fee "earned on payment" and non-refundable."16
Angell may indicate that the FSLIC's regulatory power to repudiate "any contract" includes only executory contracts. Alternatively, the decision may indicate that the FSLIC can repudiate nonexecutory contracts. This of course turns on whether a contract that
is fully performed on one side is termed executory or non-executory.116
Regardless of whether Federal's contract falls within a given definition
of executory, the court's decision seems to indicate that power to
repudiate "any contract" includes contracts fully performed on one

side. 117
In light of the Angell court's broad interpretation of a financial
institution receiver's power of repudiation,"" the RTC may rely on
Angell to support repudiation of contracts fully performed by one
party. 1 9 The RTC can argue that the FSLIC regulation that authorizes
the FSLIC receiver to repudiate "any contract"' 20 closely resembles

109. Id.
110. Id. at 396-97.
111. Id. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1988) gives the FSLIC regulatory authority to hire counsel
and 12 C.F.R. § 569(a)(6)(c)(3) (1989) provides that as receiver the FSLIC has power to reject
any contract it considers burdensome.
112. Angell, 838 F.2d at 398.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 397.
115. See id. at 396.
116. See discussion of semantic distinction at supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
119. Angell, 838 F.2d at 396-98.
120. 12 C.F.R. § 569(a)(6)(C)(3) (1989).
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the FIRREA regulation that authorizes the RTC to repudiate "any
contract."'' Additionally, the RTC can point out that the FSLIC regulations and FIRREA give financial institution receivers repudiation
power for essentially the same purpose. Both FIRREA and the FSLIC
regulations direct the receiver to "preserve and conserve" the institution's assets and property. 2 2 Thus, the RTC can claim that the receivers should have commensurate powers.
No court has ruled on whether the RTC can repudiate a non-executory contract pursuant to FIRREA. However, the recent case of Gibson v. Resolution Trust Corp.,12 raised the issue in the context of a
contract for services."2 In Gibson, the RTC had been appointed as
conservator of CenTrust Federal Bank, a Federal Savings Association,,
pursuant to FIRREA.25 Prior to conservatorship, CenTrust contracted with a law firm, establishing an $11 million fund for expenses
associated with defending the institution's former officers.12 The law
firm was permitted to draw on the fund if CenTrust failed to pay the
firm within the contractually specified time."27
When the RTC became conservator for CenTrust, the RTC repudiated the contract pursuant to its statutory powers under section
11(e) of FIRREA.' At the time of repudiation, CenTrust had selected
counsel and transferred the assets to the fund, and the law firm had
provided partial services2 9 Thus, the law firm argued that CenTrust
had fully performed under the contract, making the contract nonexecutory.'2 The law firm asserted that FIRREA did not empower
the RTC to repudiate non-executory contracts.' 3 ' However, the RTC
claimed that its statutory power to repudiate "any contract" extended
to both executory and non-executory contracts. 12 After defining an
executory contract as one with "reciprocal remaining obligations," the
court reasoned that CenTrust had not performed under the contract

121.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990).

122. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 569a.6(a)(1) (1988).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

750
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

F. Supp. 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
at 1569.
at 1568.
at 1567-68.

128. Id. at 1568.
129. See id. at 1569.
130. Id. at 1568-69.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1568.
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because it had not paid the firm.13 Additionally, the court reasoned
that the firm had not performed because it had not provided all required legal services. T Accordingly, the Gibson court held that the
RTC could repudiate the contract, 13 5 but declined to address the issue
of whether the RTC could repudiate a non-executory contract. 13
Although Angell supports the RTC's asserted broad repudiation
power, 37 the RTC's exercise of this broad power may defeat FIRREA's policy goals. The RTC must conduct its operations in a manner
3
that restores public confidence in the savings and loan industry.1
Yet, if the RTC repudiates obligations fully performed by one party,
it is likely to further undermine the public's confidence and the viability
of the savings industry as a provider of home financing. Individuals
and businesses may become reluctant to enter contracts with savings
institutions. " 9 Contracting parties will fear that after they complete
performance, the institution will become insolvent and the RTC will
repudiate the contract. 140 Ultimately, the public will perceive the savings institution as an unreliable party with which to contract. 141 The
resulting harm to the institution could, when combined with other
such cases, affect the health of the savings industry as a whole.
B.

The RTC's Power to Repudiate Burdensome Contracts

After the RTC examines the executory nature of a contract or
lease, the RTC must determine whether the contract is burdensome

133. Id. at 1569. The court found that the fund did not constitute payment. Id. Additionally,
the fact that CenTrust did not have present ability to pay, which would have led firm to resort
to the fund, did not affect the executory nature of contract. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See text accompanying supra notes 118-22.
138. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
139. Tucker et al., supra note 1, at 31-32.
140. Id.
141. See Barcley, supra note 70, at 48. Parties wishing to contract with financial institutions
should take precautions in structuring transactions with savings institutions to prevent loss if
the institution becomes insolvent. See id. at 50. Contracting parties may design these transactions
in a manner similar to transactions with a company anticipating bankruptcy. Id.; see also The
Non-Bankruptcy Alternative to Chapter 11, 39 Bus. LAW. 1041 (1984) (A Program of the
Committee on Commercial Financial Services, edited by Maury B. Poscover) (transcript of a
panel discussion in which each of the panelists plays a role in a hypothetical meeting of a debtor's
representative with the representatives of its creditors).
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to the institution.142 The RTC may exercise its discretion and its sound
business judgment in deciding which contracts are burdensome and
when repudiation will promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs.143 Thus, if the RTC determines a contract is unprofitable or undesirable to the institution, the RTC may repudiate the
contract.'- The RTC assesses the burdensome nature of an institution's
contracts on a case-by-case basis and uses no general standards in
reaching its determinations. 145 Nevertheless, an examination of contracts repudiated by the RTC illustrates the scope of the RTC's discretionary powers.
The RTC may repudiate a contract to conserve the assets of an
institution it holds in receivership.146 Thus, the RTC can repudiate a
service contract if the RTC can obtain similar services at a lower
price.147 Additionally, the RTC can repudiate a contract as burdensome, even when the contract will not diminish the institution's assets.' 48 For example, the RTC has found an institution's bid pooling
agreement burdensome because it 49would not generate a return to the
institution on its underlying debt.
In some instances, courts require receivers to consider equitable
issues in assessing a contract's burdensome nature. 10° One court required a bankruptcy receiver to consider whether repudiation served
the Bankruptcy Code's policy of accomplishing a successful reorganiza-

142. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1990). See, e.g., Rexam Ltd. Partnership, S.E. v.
RTC, 766 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D.P.R. 1991) (finding that the RTC cannot claim that the loss of
land supporting 16 provisional parking spaces will hinder the orderly administration of an institution's affairs).
143. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)(B), (0) (Supp. 1990); see Union Bank v. FSLIC, 724 F. Supp.
468 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (citing United States Trust Co. v. Wabach Ry., 150 U.S. 287, 288 (1893)).
It is possible that market conditions may govern the receiver's decision to repudiate. For
example, in a declining market, an executory agreement will be more valuable to the seller
than the commodity covered by the contract. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357 (1982). In a rising market the executory contract has a special value
for the buyer, who is assured delivery of the commodity and also can derive a profit from the
price increase. Id. The RTC may use these principles to guide its repudiation decisions.
144. Union Bank, 724 F. Supp. at 471 (noting that there have been no cases reported that
pass on the meaning of "burdensome").
145. Atlantic Mechanical, Inc. v. RTC, 772 F. Supp. 288, 291 (E.D. Va. 1991).
146. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv), (e)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1990).
147. See Atlantic Mechanical, 772 F. Supp. at 291 n.14.
148. See Union Bank, 724 F. Supp. at 471.
149. See id.
150. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
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tion.151 In doing so, the court indicated that a successful reorganization
included not only the debtor's interests, but also the interests of the
2
debtor's employees and creditors.15
Thus far, courts have not expressly required the RTC to consider
competing policies in making repudiation decisions. One court has implied that the RTC's purposes of "preserv[ing] and conserv[ing]" an
institution's assets overrides policy objectives of statutes conflicting
with FIRREA. 1 In Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp.,M employees of
a failed savings institution attempted to enjoin the RTC from terminating an ERISA employee pension plan. 55 The employees argued that
the RTC had a fiduciary duty under ERISA to continue payments to
the plan.156 The Rosa court did not express an opinion regarding the
wrongfulness of the RTC's termination of the plan,,57 but held that
the employees could not enjoin the RTC from exercising its conservatorship and receivership powers to terminate the plan.158 Furthermore, the court held that FIRREA required the employees to exhaust
the RTC's administrative claims procedure in pursuing a remedy. 159
Importantly, the Rosa court concluded that when ERISA and FIRREA provisions authorizing relief conflict, FIRREA's provisions con-

151. Id.
152. Id. In Bildisco, the Court concluded that a bankruptcy receiver could reject a collective
bargaining agreement based on equitable considerations. See id. The rights that the National
Labor Relations Act provides to the parties to a collective bargaining agreement resemble a
priority right. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 111
(1986). This right has greater relative value than the rights of other unsecured creditors. Id.
Additionally, labor law policy supports a continuation of a collective bargaining agreement, while
no bankruptcy policy exists in reorganization to compete Vith the right of the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 112-13.
153. See Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 397-98 (3d Cir. 1991).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 390.
156. Id. The district court found that the RTC as conservator had assumed the plan, thus
the RTC became an ERISA fiduciary, preventing the RTC as receiver from terminating the
plan. Rosa v. RTC, 752 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991).
Thus, the district court imposed an injunction requiring the RTC to make payments to the plan
and enjoining the RTC from terminating the plan. Id. at 1240.
157. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 400.
158. Id. at 399-400. The circuit court did not directly cite FIRREA's repudiation provision,
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e), as authority for repudiation. See id. Instead, the court relied on 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(j), which provides a court cannot take action which restrains or affects the powers of
the RTC as conservator or receiver. See id.
159. See id. at 395.
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trol. 16 The court noted that FIRREA gave the RTC broad statutory
powers to promptly resolve claims for the purposes of preserving and
conserving the assets of the institution.'16 In so noting, the court found
policy objective
FIRREA's purposes more compelling than ERISA's
62
of protecting employees and their dependents.1
If other courts follow Rosa, parties entering contracts with the
RTC will have difficulty arguing that alternate policy considerations

justify enforcing a contract. Instead, FIRREA's broad goals of effectively resolving distressed institutions'6 and the RTC's objectives of
preserving an institution's assets,- minimizing loss in the resolution
66
of cases,- and resolving claims in a quick and efficient manner will
control.
M

IV.

THE

RTC's EXERCISE OF REPUDIATION POWERS

The RTC encounters many types of contracts as receiver or conservator of savings institutions.6 In some instances, the RTC must give
special treatment to particular types of contracts pursuant to FIRREA 168 or federal regulations. 69 The RTC also may address an issue,
unique to a particular category of contracts, in a policy statement'70

160. See id. at 397. FIRREA requires exhaustion of remedies through administrative claims
procedure, while ERISA grants district court jurisdiction. See id. at 391, 397.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 397-98. Contra Rosa, 752 F. Supp. at 1240 (noting that ERISA's public
policy of protecting the security of employees and their dependents supported requiring the
RTC to continue funding the plan), rev'd, 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991).
163.

See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 307.

164. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. II 1990).
165. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(iv).
166.

H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 419.

167. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Quinn, 922 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1991) (employment contract);
Atlantic Mechanical, Inc. v. RTC, 772 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Va. 1991) (air conditioning service
contract); Jenldns-Petre Partnership One v. RTC, 1991 WL 160317 (D. Colo. 1991) (lease contract); D.M. Harris v. Western Best, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (agreement to
provide future advances on loan).
168. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(A) (Supp. II 1990) (qualified financial contracts); id. §
1821(e)(11) (secured contracts); id. § 1821(e)(1) (repudiation of leases).
169. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(5) (1992) (employment contracts regulation).
170.

See, e.g., RESOLUTION TRUST

CORPORATION,

Statement of Policy Regarding the

Payment of Interest on Direct Collateralized Obligations After Appointment of the Resolution
Trust Corporation as Conservator or Receiver, 55 Fed. Reg. 14,368 (1990), available in
WESTLAW, FFIN-NR database (included as an attachment to an RTC news release entitled
"RTC Approves Policy on Payment of Interest on Collateralized Borrowings") [hereinafter Collateralized Obligations Policy].
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or interpretve letter.' 7 1 Additionally, the RTC must repudiate each
contract within a reasonable time period.72
A.

Statutory Limitations on the RTC's Repudiation of
Qualified FinancialContracts

The most prominent limitation on the RTC's exercise of repudiation
power appears directly in FIRREA's statutory language. FIRREA
places a limit on the RTC's abilities to repudiate qualified financial
contracts (QFC) of failed institutions.' FIRREA defines QFCs as
securities contracts, 74 commodities contracts,17 5 forward contracts, 76

171. See, e.g., Self-Help Liquidation of Collateral by Second Claimants in Receiverships,
FDIC Interpretive Letter (FDIC-89-49), [1989-1990 Transfer Binder], Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,265 (Dec. 15, 1989); Treatment of Deposits of Public Funds Pooled and Collateralized
by Appropriate Securities When Bank Fails and FDIC is Appointed Receiver, FDIC Interpretative Letter (FDIC-90-71), [1990-1991 Transfer Binder], Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81,359
(Nov. 27, 1990).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
173. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A), (E).
174. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i). The term "securities contract" has the meaning given to it in
the Bankruptcy Code, except the term "security" includes mortgage loans, mortgage related
securities, and any interest in any mortgage loan or mortgages-related securities. Id. §
1821(e)(8)(D)(ii). However, "security" does not include a participation in a commercial loan. Id.
The Bankruptcy Code defines "securities contract" as a "contract for the purchase, sale or loan
of a security, including an option for the purchase or sale of a security, certificate of deposit,
or group of index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof) ......
11 U.S.C. § 741(7) (1988).
175. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i) (Supp. 11 1990). The term "commodities contracts" has
the meaning given to it in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(iii). The Bankruptcy Code
defines a commodities contract as follows:
(A) with respect to a futures commission merchant, contract for the purchase or
sale of a commodity for future delivery on, or subject to the rules of, a contract
market or board of trade;
(B) with respect to a foreign futures commission merchant, foreign future;
(C) with respect to a leverage transaction merchant, leverage transaction;
(D) with respect to a clearing organization, contract for the purchase or sale of a
commodity future delivery on, or subject to the rules of, a contract market or
board of trade that is cleared by such clearing organization, or commodity option
traded on, or subject to the rules of, a contract market or board of trade that is
cleared by such clearing organization;
(E) with respect to a commodity options dealer, commodity option.
11 U.S.C. § 761(4) (1988).
176. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i) (Supp. II 1990). The term "forward contracts" has the
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repurchase agreements,
agreements, 17s and other similar agreements which the RTC determines by regulation to be a QFC.1 9 Upon
appointment of the RTC as receiver or conservator, FIRREA provides
special protection to QCF parties. This protection may preclude the
RTC from repudiating QFCs.' 8°
A QFC party 8' retains any right to terminate or liquidate a QFC
that arises on appointment of the RTC as receiver. 182 The party can
"77swap

same meaning given to it in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(iv). The Bankruptcy Code
defines the term forward contract as:
[A] contract (other than a commodity contract) for the purchase, sale, or transfer
of a commodity ...
or any similar good, article, service right, or interest, which
is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the forward contract
trade, or product or byproduct thereof, with a maturity date more than two days
after the date the contract is entered into, including, but not limited to, a repurchase
transaction, reverse repurchase transaction, consignment, lease, swap, hedge transaction, deposit, loan, option, allocated transaction, unallocated transaction, or any
combination thereof or option thereon.
11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (Supp. II 1990).
177. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i) (Supp. II 1990). The term "repurchase agreements" has
the same meaning given to it in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(v). Under FIRREA,
however, the term also includes mortgage-related securities, any mortgage loan, and any interest
in any mortgage loan, but will not include any participation in a commercial mortgage loan. Id.
The Bankruptcy Code defines the term repurchase agreements as
an agreement ... which provides for the transfer of certificates of deposit, eligible
bankers' acceptances, or securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any agency of the
United States against the transfer of funds by the transferree of such certificates
of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities with a simultaneous agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor thereof certificates of deposit,
eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities ... at a date certain not later than one
year after such transfers or on demand, against the transfer of funds.
11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (1988).
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i) (Supp. II 1990). Under FIRREA, swap agreement is
defined as
any agreement ... which is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, commodity swap,
forward rate agreement, interest rate future, interest rate option purchased, forward foreign exchange agreement, rate cap agreement, rate floor agreement, rate
collar agreement, currency swap agreement, cross-currency rate swap agreement,
currency future, or currency option purchase or any other similar agreement.
Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(vi).
179. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i).
180. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A), (E).
181. As used in this note, a QFC party is any party to a QFC contract.
182. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(A)(i).
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exercise the right at any time after the RTC is appointed receiver.1
If the RTC is appointed conservator of a savings institution, a QFC
party can exercise any right to terminate, liquidate or accelerate the
QFC based on a default under the contract that is enforceable under
noninsolvency law.'- Additionally, a QFC party retains rights under
security arrangements relating to the QFC I and may obtain any
termination values and payment amounts due under the QFC.1FIRREA's special QFC provisions recognize the critical role of
these contracts in financial markets.187 QFCs give savings institutions
the liquidity and hedging abilities they need for portfolio and risk
management.' Furthermore, FIRREA's specific QFC provisions send
important signals to financial markets regarding enforceability of QFC
contracts after the appointment of a conservator or receiver.- Thus,
in light of FIRREA's QFC provisions, it appears that the financial
markets can rely on these contracts. 1 9°
B.

Policy Statements and Interpretive Letters Regarding
Repudiation of Collateralized Contracts

When issues arising under certain types of contracts are not addressed by specific statutory provisions, the RTC may resolve them by
issuing policy statements.191 In these instances, the RTC has repudiated a particular type of agreement and subsequently issued a
statement regarding the terms and conditions surrounding the repudiation.192 Additionally, the RTC has occasionally published letters that
interpret FIRREA. 193 In these letters, the RTC has responded to
specific hypothetical situations that might arise in the conservatorship
or receivership of an institution. 194 The RTC's responses in these letters
are merely advisory opinions and are not binding on the RTC as

183. Id.
184. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(E)(i).
185. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A)(ii), (E)(ii).
186. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A)(iii), (E)(iii).
187. FDIC, FDIC Statement of Policy on Qualified Financial Contracts, Dec. 12, 1989,
reprinted in LITIGATING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC, supra note 11, at 184.
188. Id.
189. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(A), (E) (Supp. II 1990).
190. See id.; FDICStatement of Policy on QualifiedFinancialContracts, supranote 187.
191. See, e.g., Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., Interpretive Letter Regarding Secured Contract, supra note 171.
194. See id.
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receiver or conservator. 195 Yet, the RTC provides them as guidance
to parties entering contracts with potentially insolvent financial institutions. 196

The RTC has used both policy statements and interpretive letters
to address repudiation of secured contracts. 197 In these statements and
letters, the RTC delineates its proposed treatment of specific types
of secured obligations. 19 For example, the RTC's "Statement of Policy
Regarding Payment of Interest on Direct Collateralized Borrowings"
(Collateralized Obligations Policy) interprets FIRREA's provision concerning repudiation of contracts involving security interests. 199 This
security interest provision states that FIRREA's repudiation provisions "shall not be construed as permitting the avoidance of any legally
enforceable or perfected security interest in any assets of any depository institution," but permits the RTC to avoid any security interest
"taken in contemplation of the institution's insolvency or with the
intent to hinder, delay or defraud the institution or creditors of such
institution."m In a policy statement regarding this provision, the RTC
concludes that although FIRREA generally protects the security interest of a contracting party, it does not prohibit the RTC from repudiating a contract secured by collateral. 20 , Although a contracting
party has collateral backing the repudiated contract, that party may
not recover the full value of the collateral. 2°2 Instead, the party may
only recover the statutorily limited damages for repudiation provided
in FIRREA.m Thus, the contracting party will receive the value of
the collateral only to the statutory damages limit.20
The RTC, in its policy statement, applies its general powers regarding secured interests to repudiate collateralized borrowings. 20 5 The
RTC concludes that it can exercise its right of repudiation to call,
redeem, or prepay collateralized borrowings. 206 In exercising this right,

195.

See id.

196. See id.
197.
198.
Secured
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id.; Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
See Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170; Interpretive Letter Regarding
Contract, supra note 171.
See Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(11) (Supp. II 1990).
Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
Id.
Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1990).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1990).
See Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 9
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

the RTC can repudiate these obligations by either making a cash
payment directly to the secured party in exchange for the release of
collateral or by expressly repudiating the borrowing contract and requiring a trustee to liquidate the collateral. °7 Although FIRREA's
statutory provisions appear to limit damages for repudiation of all
secured contracts,20 the RTC has agreed in its policy statement to
pay interest on the collateralized borrowing,2 and to pay this interest
at the contract rate until redemption or payment of the obligation.210
In addition to its policy statement addressing collateralized contracts, the RTC has issued a policy statement addressing the exercise
of repudiation powers over collateralized letters of credit.21 1 In this
statement, the RTC concludes that its Collateralized Obligations Policy
also applies to collateralized letters of credit.212 Thus, the RTC can

207. Id.
208. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. 11 1990).
209. Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
210. Id.
211. Resolution Trust Corporation, Statement of Policy Regarding Treatment of Collateralized Letters of Credit After Appointment of the Resolution Trust Corporationas Conservator or Receiver, Sept. 25, 1990, reprinted in LITIGATING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC, supra
note 11, at 42 [hereinafter Letter of Credit Policy]. The RTC's policy applies only to collateralized
letters of credit utilized in capital markets financing transactions, and not to trade or other
letters of credit. Id. The RTC has issued no policy statement about these other letters of credit.
However, pursuant to FIRREA's general provision, the RTC can repudiate these obligations
as well. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. III 1991). The RTC's repudiation of these obligations
raises special issues regarding payment of damages. In these cases, the RTC's repudiation
denies the beneficiary of a letter of credit a claim for damages because the beneficiary's claim
arises after insolvency and therefore is not provable. Lawrence F. Bates, Bank and Thrift
Liquidation Law and the Impact of the FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, in LITIGATING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC, supra note 11, at 7, 23-24. The
RTC's ability to avoid payment of damages to a beneficiary alters past decisions requiring the
FDIC as receiver to pay damages. See First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361,
1367-69 (9th Cir.) (claim under standby letter of credit is provable if meeting three conditions:
(1) claim exists before insolvency and does not depend on receiver's contractual obligations
arising after insolvency; (2) total liability is certain at the time the beneficiaries bring suit
against institution's receiver; and (3) claims are made in timely manner, before distribution of
assets from receivership estate), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978). But see Edgardo E. Colon,
Letters of Credit in Times of Business and Bank Failures, 107 BANKING L.J. 6, 29-31 (1990)
(arguing FIRREA only gives the RTC historical receivership powers which encompass the First
Empire limitation regarding repudiation of letters of credit; also arguing that letters of credit
are not formal contracts and therefore do not fall within the RTC's repudiation powers).
212. Letter of Credit Policy, supra note 211.
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Overall, the RTC's asserted ability to repudiate collateralized borrowing contracts and collateralized letters of credit serves FIRREA's
dual goals. The RTC's payment of interest helps perpetuate a reliable
and strong savings and loan industry, 214 while the RTC's ability to
repudiate collateralized contracts helps 2 reduce the overall cost of
operating the institution in receivership. 15
C. Regulatory Provisions and Employment Contract Termination
Regulatory provisions govern the termination of several types of
contracts held by insolvent savings institutions. 21 6 When regulatory
provisions call for the termination of a contract, the RTC cannot exercise discretion in applying its repudiation powers. One such regulation,
21 7
12 C.F.R. § 563.39, addresses termination of employment contracts.
Section 563.39 provides that an employment contract with a failed
institution will automatically terminate when the RTC or the FDIC
enters into an assistance agreement with the savings institution,218
when the Office of Thrift Supervision Director approves a supervisory
merger of the institution, 219 or when the Director finds the institution
in an "unsafe or unsound" condition.30 When applied, section 563.39
terminates "all obligations"' of the institution under the employment
contract - including, for example, severance pay.2
However, section 536.39 prohibits the RTC from terminating a
contract necessary for the continued operation of the institution.m In

213. Id.
214. Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.
215. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corporation, RTC Announces Decision to Repudiate Six
CollateralizedBond Issues of Franklin Savings Association, Ottawa, Kansas, RTC Press Release, June 8, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FFIN-NR database (noting that the RTC's
repudiation of six collateralized bond issues issued by Franklin would reduce the costs of operat-

ing Franklin).
216.
217.
218.
219.

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 563.39 (1992).
Id.
Id. § 563.39(b)(5)(i).
Id. § 563.39(b)(5)(ii).

220. Id.
221.
222.

Id. § 563.39(b)(5).
See Rush v. FDIC, 747 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (concluding that because

savings and loan employee's right under an employment contract to termination pay had not
vested, the right was not enforceable against the FSLIC as receiver).
223. 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(5) (1992).
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this instance, employees will retain benefits under these employment
contracts. Additionally, section 563.39 provides that the RTC will not
terminate benefits under a contract when the benefits are vested at
the time the institution is declared insolvent.- However, if a contract
entitles an employee to receive benefits for termination without cause,
the automatic termination on declaration of insolvency does not cause
the contractual benefits to vest.
The termination of employment contracts under section 563.39 appears consistent with FIRREA's goals. By permitting termination of
excessive and long term benefitsu2 6 the regulation preserves the institution's assets.- 7 The regulation's termination provisions also reflect
the fact that some directors and officers receiving benefits under employment contracts have caused the institution's failure through mismanagement.
Yet, in some instances section 563.39 poses equitable concerns
based on the nature of the employment contract.229 In contrast to
general receivership claimants which enter contracts with the savings
institution for profit,9 0 employees of an institution act on behalf of
that institution and receive no benefits from the institution's individual
transactions.9 1 Thus, employees have a unique status that may entitle
22
them to special treatment by the receiver. 3
Additionally, employees may be entitled to special contractual benefits under non-receivership law. For example, corporate directors
and officers often enter indemnification contracts with institutions to
cover litigation costs of suits brought against the directors or officers

224. Id.
225. Rush, 747 F. Supp. at 578 (holding that termination of employment contract as a
matter of law on declaration that institution is insolvent does not constitute termination without
cause).
226. Id.
227. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 1II 1991).
228. FSLIC v. Quinn, 922 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting in dicta that the FSLIC
"should not have to fund golden parachutes" for negligent and corrupt officers of failed savings
and loan institutions).
229. These concerns are illustrated in In re THC Fin. Corp., 446 F.
1977). Although this bankruptcy case was decided under the pre-1978
discussion in this case applies as well to situations where the FSLIC or
troubled institution and seek to terminate employment contracts pursuant
(1992).
230. See In re THC Fin. Corp., 446 F. Supp. at 1332.
231. See id.
232. See id.
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in their corporate capacity.3 These employees hold special rights
under corporate law which enable them to act on behalf of the corporation without incurring personal liability.2 Terminating these employees' indemnification agreements through repudiation may conflict
with the employees rights under corporate law.m
Repudiation of Leases by the RTC
FIRREA expressly provides that the RTC can repudiate leases.26
This repudiation power reaffirms the common law power of a receiver
to reject leases.2 37 FIRREA also reaffirms the authority of receivers
of failed savings institutions to repudiate leases under federal banking
regulations.m Since the RTC has quickly become the owner of a staggering amount of real property throughout the United States,.2 9 the
RTC's exercise of repudiation powers under FIRREA has the potential
to affect thousands of lessors and lessees. Although the RTC has
validly repudiated many commercial leases pursuant to FIRREA,40
the RTC's repudiation of residential leases has proven more controversial.
In a 1991 policy statement, the RTC asserted its powers to repudiate residential leases subject to rent control.24 In this policy statement, the RTC also indicated that it would not repudiate leases of
lower- or moderate-income tenantsYw This policy statement has captured the attention of state and local officials who impose the rent
controls and of the affected tenants. Consequently, these parties have
D.

233.

See id.

234. See id. at 1331-32.
235. See id. at 1332.
236. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
237. See 66 Am. JUR. 2D Leases § 232 (1973).
238. See Argonaut Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FDIC, 392 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding
that the FDIC as receiver of lessee, a national bank, can disaffirm institution's lease for real
property).
239. See Tucker et al., supra note 1, at 7.
240. See, e.g., Bayshore Executive Plaza Partnership v. FDIC, 943 F.2d 1290, 1292 (11th
Cir. 1991).
241. Resolution Trust Corporation, RTC BoardApproves Policyfor Dispositionof Residential Properties Subject to Rent Control, RTC News Release, Feb. 25, 1991, available in
WESTLAW, FFTN-NR database (1991 WL 22039 (R.T.C.)).
242. Id. (defining low- and moderate-income tenants as those with family or individual
incomes not exceeding 115% of the area median income).
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challenged the RTC's authority to disregard state statutory schemes
3
regulating the rights of residential tenants.?
Although these challenges have not yet been resolved, the court
in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond2 " implied that the RTC's repudiation powers in the residential lease context will depend on the
facts surrounding the repudiation.? 5 The Diamond court further implied that in order to issue a broad policy statement on residential
tenancies, the RTC must first consider the repudiation's effects on all
institutions and rent-controlled residential tenants.?6 Moreover, the
controversy surrounding repudiation of rent-controlled residential
leases also has engendered congressional action. Two bills were introduced in 1991 which sought to preclude the RTC from repudiating
7
residential leases regulated by state and local law.?
The RTC's difficulty in making decisions regarding residential
leases has stemmed in part from the RTC's conflicting mandates under
FIRREA. FIRREA directs the RTC to maximize return on equity
from the sale of assets in its inventory without disrupting real estate
markets and to ensure a stable economic climate.? " At the same time,
FIRREA directs the RTC to use those same assets to maximize opportunities for affordable housing.3 9 The RTC's predecessors, the
FDIC and the FSLIC, were not directed to provide affordable housing.25 Thus, unlike its predecessors, the RTC must consider these
potentially conflicting policies and utilize the methods most consistent
with those policies in the resolution of a savings institution.
E.

Timing of Repudiation

FIRREA specifies that the RTC must exercise its repudiation
powers within a reasonable time.- ' By not designating a specific time

243. See, e.g., RTC v. Diamond, 137 F.R.D. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 640.
246. See id.
247. H.R. 320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (entitled the "Tenant Protection Act of 1991"
and amending FIRREA); H.R. 2244, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (also entitled "Tenant Protection Act of 1991" amending the Federal Home Loan Bank Act).
248. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C) (Supp. III 1991).
249. Id.
250. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988) (pre-FIRREA duties of the FDIC generally); id. § 1821(d)
(pre-FIRREA duties of the FDIC as receiver); id. § 1725 (pre-FIRREA duties of the FSLIC
generally); id. § 1729(b) (pre-FIRREA duties of the FSLIC as receiver).
251. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
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limitation,?2 FIRREA allows courts to consider several factors in determining whether the RTC repudiated a contract within a reasonable
time. If the contract involves large sums of money, the court will
allow the RTC a longer period of time to repudiate.20 Additionally,
if the decision to repudiate involves lengthy procedures, such as assessing the value of a complex contract, a court may lengthen the reasonable period for repudiation.
In its policy statements, the RTC has established a time limitation
for repudiation of certain types of agreements. For example, in its
Collateralized Obligation Policy, the RTC has asserted that it must
repudiate a collateralized borrowing agreement within sixty days of
its appointment as receiver or conservator.2 6 If the RTC fails to repudiate such an agreement within the allotted time, the contract will
automatically remain in effect as long as the institution remains in
conservatorship or receivership.27 The RTC based this policy on the
need to provide certainty and stability in financial markets,m and
noted that the price sensitivity of the collateral securing these loans
requires the RTC to make its repudiation decision within the sixty
day period.259
In another policy statement, the RTC indicated that it has 180
days to repudiate collateralized letters of credit. 260 The RTC asserts

that it requires this time to evaluate these highly complex transactions.ml Furthermore, in addition to FIRREA's mandates and the
RTC's own policy statements, the FDIC has established a time limit
for the RTC's repudiation of collateralized put options.2

2

In doing so

252. See Union Bank v. FSLIC, 724 F. Supp. 468, 470-71 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
253. See id. at 471 (reasoning that 'the large sum of money involved" was one factor
supporting a "reasonable" delay of four months between the appointment of receiver and repudiation of the contract under FIRREA).
254. See id.
255. See, e.g., Collateralized Obligations Policy, supra note 170.

256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

260. Letter of Credit Policy, supra note 211.
261. Id.
262. FDIC, Statement of Policy Regarding Treatment of CollateralizedPut Obligations
After Appointment of the FDIC as Conservator or Receiver, 56 Fed. Reg. 36,152 (1991).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 9
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

the FDIC specified that 180 days from the date of the RTC's appointment as conservator or receiver constitutes a reasonable time for
repudiation of collateralized put options.2M
It is not clear whether the RTC's failure to repudiate a contract
within a reasonable period of time constitutes an adoption of the contract. 2 6 Under common law, some courts found that a receiver's failure
to repudiate a contract within a reasonable time made the contract
binding. 26. Yet under common law, receivers could proceed under a
contract experimentally to assess its value without signaling intent to
adopt the contract and still retain the power of repudiation. 2 66 Under
this doctrine, the RTC's inaction would not result in adoption. Alternatively, the receiver's failure to repudiate the contract within a
reasonable time may affect the claim for damages. 267
V.

DAMAGES FOR REPUDIATION OF CONTRACTS AND LEASES

A.

Damages for Repudiation Generally

FIRREA contains several provisions addressing the damages recoverable when the RTC repudiates a contract or lease. FIRREA's
general damages provision states that a contract claimant can recover
only "actual direct compensatory damages" when the RTC repudiates
its contract.* FIRREA also contains specific provisions which enumerate damages recoverable for repudiation of certain types of contracts, including: contracts for services,269 leases under which the institution is lessee,2 70 leases under which the institution is lessor, 2
contracts for the sale of real property,- 2 and qualified financial con-

263. Id.
264. See Veal, supra note 49, at 234.
265. Crawford v. Gordon, 153 P. 363, 366 (1915).
266. Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 F. 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1914); see also
Quincey, Mo. & Pac. Ry. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82 (1892) (finding that a receiver can take
possession of a leased railway line and operate it for more than one year, then exercise repudiation
powers).
267. See Veal, supra note 49, at 234.
268. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1991). Ordinarily, repudiation of contract gives
rise to damages for total breach of contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(1)
(1981). These damages include recovery for loss, including incidental or consequential loss caused
by the breach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) (1981).
269. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(7) (Supp. III 1991).
270. Id. § 1821(e)(4).
271. Id. § 1821(e)(5).
272. Id. § 1821(e)(6).
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tracts. 73 FIRREA's damages provisions significantly clarify the application of common law damage principles in the repudiation context. 74
FIRREA's statutory provisions are general guidelines for assessing
damages awarded for the RTC repudiations. FIRREA limits damages
by precluding recovery of punitive and exemplary damages, damages
for lost profits and opportunity, and damages for pain and suffering.2 5
Additionally, FIRREA's general damages provision specifies that damages will be calculated from the date the conservator or receiver is
appointed. 6 Because FIRREA's damage provisions significantly restrict recovery, in some instances a contract claimant will recover no
damages for repudiation.2 Furthermore, FIRREA's damage provisions may preclude recovery of incidental or consequential damages
resulting from the repudiation.2 s
B. Damagesfor Repudiation of Service Contracts
In addition to its general damages provisions, FIRREA contains
special provisions addressing damages recoverable for repudiation of
service contracts. 9 If a party provides services to an institution prior
to receivership, that party will be paid pursuant to general claims
procedures.2 However, if the RTC accepts performance under a service contract subsequent to its appointment, it must pay for such services as administrative expenses.2 1 Although the RTC must pay for

273.
274.
275.

Id. § 1821(e)(3)(C).
Guy, supra note 11, at 140.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(b)(i)-(iii) (Supp. III 1991).

276.

Id. § 1821(e)(3)(A)(ii)(I).

277. See, e.g., Union Bank v. FSLIC, 724 F. Supp. 468, 472 (E.D. Ky. 1989). In Union
Bank, Fidelity Federal Savings Bank (Fidelity) and its loan participant, Hiawatha Savings &
Loan Association (Hiawatha), made an agreement to pool funds to bid jointly on property secured
by their note at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 470. The parties intended to keep the bidding price
to the amount of two outstanding notes. Id. Before the sale, the FSLIC, later succeeded by
the RTC, placed Fidelity in receivership. Id. The RTC repudiated the bid pooling agreement,
and Hiawatha sought to recover damages. Id. The court cited the FIRREA provision limiting
recovery to actual direct compensatory damages, and found that Hiawatha suffered no actual
damages as of the date of the appointment of the conservator. Id. at 472. The Union Bank
court applied FIRREA's damages provisions to preclude Hiawatha from recovering damages
for the lost opportunity to bid jointly on the property. See id.
278. See id. (implying that Hiawatha would receive no incidental or consequential damages
from repudiation).
279. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(7) (Supp. III 1991).
280. Id. § 1821(e)(7)(A).
281. Id. § 1821(e)(7)(B)(ii).
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services it receives, the RTC's acceptance of a service contract does
not guarantee that it will not later repudiate that contract.
C.

Damages for Repudiation of Leases

FIRREA also contains several specific provisions addressing damages recoverable for repudiation of leases.2 FIRREA's lease provisions both clarify and limit the damages recoverable at common law
for lease repudiation. At common law, when a receiver of an insolvent
lessee repudiated a lease, the receiver did not have to pay damages
to the lessor of rent reserved but not yet due.2 However, in most
instances, the receiver had to pay damages to the lessor for the remainder of the rental term, based on the present value of future rental
payments.2
FIRREA places greater restrictions on damages recoverable for
repudiation than common-law decisions. FIRREA allows the RTC to
repudiate the lease as lessee,-6 and contains a number of provisions
which clarify and limit damages recoverable by the lessor.2 For example, upon repudiation the RTC is only liable to the lessor for contractual
rent which accrued prior to either the date on which the notice of
repudiation is mailed- or the date on which the repudiation becomes

282. See id. § 1821(e)(7)(B).
283. Id. § 1821(e)(4)-(5).
284. See Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313, 324 (1891) (implying that unaccrued
rent is not a present obligation, but is payable in the future, and thus a lessor cannot claim
damages for rent accruing after the disaffirmance by the receiver); see also FDIC v. Grella,
553 F.2d 258, 262-64 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that the FDIC regulations allow a bank receiver
as lessee to disaffirm a lease and deny any claim by a landlord for rent or damages not yet
accrued). But see Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 604-05 (1918) (holding
that a lessor can recover damages under express damages provision in lease).
285. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 444 (1937). But see
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. First Nat'l Bank of Wheaton, 78 F.2d 502, 503 (7th Cir.) (holding
that absent a specific term in the lease, damages for remainder of the rental term cannot be
recovered when a lease is repudiated), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651 (1935). Additionally, the lessor
could recover compensation from the estate of the lessee for use of the premises by the receiver
prior to adopting or repudiating the lease. Oscar Heineman Corp. v. National Levy & Co., 6
F.2d 970, 974 (2d Cir. 1925) (reasoning that compensation for use of the premises by the receiver
prior to repudiation is based not on the rent in the lease but on reasonable value for the use).
If the lease contained a provision for liquidated damages, some courts allowed the lessor to
claim this amount. E.g., William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597, 601-03 (1918).
286. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
287. Id. § 1821(e)(4)(A), (B).
288. Id. § 1821(e)(4)(B)(i)(I).
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effective, 28 whichever comes later.m Additionally, the RTC is not
liable for damages under an acceleration clause or penalty provision
of the lease.21
The RTC also can repudiate as lessor. 2 In these instances, after
the RTC's repudiation, the lessee can either treat the lease as terminatedm or remain in possession of the leased property for the balance
of the lease term. If the lessee remains in possession for the balance
of the term, the lessee must make rental payments, 295 but can offset
against rent any damages it suffers as a result of the RTC's failure
to perform under the lease.2
D. Damages for Repudiation of Contractsfor Sale of
Real Property
FIRREA limits damages recoverable for the RTC's repudiation of
real property sales contracts.m If the RTC repudiates such a contract,
and the purchaser is in possession and not in default, the purchaser
can either treat the contract as terminated by the repudiation,2

or

it can remain in possession. 29 If the purchaser remains in possession,
the purchaser must continue to make payments due under the contract.3 ° A purchaser who continues payment will receive title from
the RTC,0 1 but cannot enforce specific performance of the contract.3 02
Instead, the purchaser can offset against its payments any damages
caused by the RTC's failure to fully perform under the contract. 303

289. Id. § 1821(e)(4)(B)(i)(II). However, the RTC probably cannot send a post-insolvency
notification of repudiation which retroactively disaffirms the lease effective on the date of insolvency. Cf. 80 Pine Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 424 F. Supp. 908, 909-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(pre-FIRREA) (holding that the FDIC as receiver did not have the power to disaffirm a lease
in a manner that would alter or affect the rights of other creditors by creating a claim to the
landlord which did not exist at the time).
290. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991).
291. Id. § 1821(e)(4)(B)(ii).
292. Id. § 1821(e)(1).
293. Id. § 1821(e)(5)(A)(i).
294. Id. § 1821(e)(5)(A)(ii).
295. Id. § 1821(e)(5)(B)(i)(I).
296. Id. § 1821(e)(5)(B)(i)(II).
297. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(ii).
298. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(A)(i).
299. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(A)(ii).
300. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(i)(I).
301. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(ii)(II).
302. See id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(ii)(III).
303. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(i)(II).
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Damages for Repudiation of Qualified FinancialContracts

FIRREA specifically sets forth the damages recoverable for repudiation of certain qualified financial contracts .3 The damages awarded
for repudiation of a QFC go beyond "actual direct compensatory damages" awarded for repudiation of contracts generally.305 Damages recoverable for repudiation of QFCs include the normal reasonable costs
of cover or any other reasonable measure of damages generally
awarded for repudiation of the type of contract involved.30 6 Damages
accrue from the date of repudiation of the QFC. 3 7 In some cases, the
institution's liquidated assets may be inadequate to cover the higher
damages potentially afforded QFC beneficiaries. Thus, liquidity constraints may render the benefits of FIRREA's QFC damage provisions
irrelevant3 os
VI.

CONCLUSION

FIRREA permits the RTC to repudiate a wide variety of contracts O9 and limits damages the RTC must pay to contracting parties.31° FIRREA also gives the RTC great latitude over its repudiation
powers3 11 by expressly permitting the RTC to exercise discretion in
deciding whether a contract is burdensome.3 12 Furthermore, FIRREA
appears to grant the RTC discretion to repudiate contracts often considered "non-executory" - those where one party has fully performed.313
When the RTC exercises its repudiation powers, it often causes
4
parties contracting with the institution to suffer substantial losses.'
Nevertheless, the RTC's exercise of repudiation power has generally

304. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(C).
305. Compare id. § 1821(e)(3)(C) (allowing damages for repudiation of a QFC to include
"normal and reasonable costs of cover or other reasonable measures utilized in the industr[y]")
with id. § 1821(e)(3)(A)(i) (limiting damages for most other contracts to "actual direct compensatory damages").
306. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(C)(i).
307. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(A)(ii)(II).
308. See Veal, supra note 49, at 236.
309. See supra note 167.
310. See supra notes 268-308 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
312. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
313. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 38:3, 388-90 (3d Cir. 1991) (involving potential loss
of pension plan benefits).
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withstood judicial scrutiny.3 15 Courts have found that the RTC has
exercised its powers under FIRREA in a manner consistent with the
overall purposes of FIRREA.3 16 The RTC has repudiated contracts in
the interests of maintaining a viable and independent savings and loan
industry 317 and has conducted operations to quickly and efficiently resolve the institutions in receivership.318
Additionally, the RTC has, for the most part, acted in accordance
with its direct receivership mandates under FIRREA 3 9 by exercising
its repudiation powers to "preserve and conserve" the assets of institutions.m The RTC's exercise of repudiation powers most often conflicts
with its specific mandates under FIRREA when the RTC is dealing
with residential properties. s21 In these instances, the RTC must balance FIRREA's conflicting goals of providing affordable housing and
maximizing return on the institution's assets.2 Moreover, in repudiating residential property contracts, the RTC must remain mindful of
FIRREA's broad goal of maintaining public confidence and trust in
the savings industry as an industry committed to providing financing
for home ownership.32 Proposed legislation may provide the RTC with
needed guidance in this difficult area. 32?
When FIRREA's congressional mandates do not conflict, courts
will likely continue to support the RTC's broad exercise of repudiation
powers in furtherance of FIRREA's broad policy goals. Congress intended to address the savings and loan crisis with strong, comprehensive legislation.32 2 In enacting FIRREA, Congress created the RTC
and gave it repudiation power to efficiently resolve the problem of
distressed savings institutions.326 In light of this, the RTC's exercise
of broad repudiation power is consistent with the spirit of FIRREA's
comprehensive legislative reforms and FIRREA's goal of returning
savings institutions to their position as strong providers of home
financing.
Wendy Cousins
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Rosa, 938 F.2d 383.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
See supra text accompanying note 44.
See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 43.
See supra text accompanying notes 248-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 248-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 248-50.
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34, 45 and accompanying text.
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